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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of the combined U.S. state and federal mortgage interest 
deduction (MID) on homeownership attainment, using data from 1984 to 2007 and exploiting 
variation in the subsidy across states, over time and due to inter-state moves. We test whether 
capitalization of the MID into house prices offsets the positive effect on homeownership. We 
find that the MID only boosts homeownership attainment of higher income households in less 
tightly regulated housing markets. In more restrictive places – typically larger coastal cities – 
an adverse effect exists. The MID is an ineffective policy to promote homeownership and 
improve social welfare. 
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1 Introduction 
The mortgage interest deduction (MID) presents an important tax subsidy1 for U.S. 
homeowners.  In 2007, an additional dollar of mortgage interest generated on average 26 cents in 
tax savings.2  This subsidy constitutes a very substantial revenue loss for the U.S. Treasury: the 
MID is the second largest U.S. tax expenditure, valued at an estimated $104.5 billion in foregone 
tax revenue in fiscal year 2011 (Office of Management and Budget, 2010).3  Given the 
magnitude of the MID subsidy, the assessment of its effectiveness in terms of promoting 
homeownership is of first order policy relevance.   
In addition to the federal subsidy, the MID taken on state income taxes can be substantial 
as well, with some states providing a net state subsidy in excess of 9 cents per dollar of mortgage 
interest.  However, there are large differences across U.S. states in this tax subsidy: states such as 
California, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts and North Carolina rely heavily on personal income 
taxation to raise revenue, permitting the deduction of mortgage interest, while other states such 
as Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Wyoming and Alaska levy no personal income tax at 
all (Minnesota Department of Revenue, 2009).  There is also substantial variation over time. For 
example, Arizona, New York and Wisconsin experience roughly a doubling of the net state 
subsidy rate between 1984 and 2007.    
In this paper we take advantage of this cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the 
MID – in conjunction with various fixed effects, interaction effects, and geographical matching 
of various datasets – to tease out in some detail how the MID impacts individual homeownership 
                                                            
1 We use the term ‘subsidy’ because under current U.S. tax law, landlords are taxed on their net rental income. The 
interest on their mortgages is not a personal expense but an expense necessary to earn the rental income. Owner-
occupiers do not have to pay taxes on their imputed rental income, yet, they can still deduct mortgage interest from their 
income taxes.  
2 Authors' calculations using tax subsidy data generated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), as 
described in the data section. 
3 The largest tax expenditure is the exclusion of employers’ contributions for their employees’ medical insurance 
premiums and medical care. 
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decisions. Specifically, we exploit variation in the subsidy across states, over the years and due 
to inter-state moves of households to demonstrate how local housing market conditions and 
income status affect the way the MID influences household specific homeownership decisions.    
Homeownership has been associated with various positive externalities, and, as a result, 
tax subsidies to homeowners may be efficiency improving.4  Although intended to encourage 
homeownership, relatively little is known however as to whether or not the MID indeed 
increases the likelihood that the individual on the margin will own his or her housing.5  We 
hypothesize that, if an impact of the MID on homeownership attainment exists, it will vary by 
local housing conditions, in particular, it will vary by the tightness of regulatory constraints on 
land use (i.e., by the extent to which the local housing supply is price inelastic). We also 
hypothesize that this mechanism generates unintended consequences:  In places with tight land 
use regulation (inelastic supply), notably the highly urbanized places that stand to benefit most 
from the potential positive externalities of homeownership, the tax subsidies will tend to be 
capitalized into house prices, and the housing stock will not expand to facilitate higher 
homeownership rates.  The mortgage subsidies will thus generate price capitalization effects 
rather than quantity responses.  In this instance, not only will the MID not bring about higher 
homeownership attainment, such price capitalization effects may create a perverse outcome 
whereby the MID adversely affects the homeownership attainment of certain groups: increases in 
the MID may decrease the likelihood that down-payment-constrained households will be able to 
                                                            
4 See, for example, Dietz and Haurin (2003). 
5 While the federal income tax put in place by 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution allowed for the deduction of any 
interest paid and did not distinguish mortgage interest, the intent of keeping mortgage interest deductible in the 1986 Tax 
reform Act was to promote homeownership.  In a 1984 speech regarding his tax reform agenda, President Reagan stated 
he would “preserve the part of the American dream which the home mortgage interest deduction symbolizes” (Howard, 
1997, p. 108).  Thus, if not before, at least by 1986 there was arguably an explicit intent to use the MID to encourage 
homeownership.  
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purchase a house in order to take advantage of the mortgage subsidy. It may also make 
homeownership a less attractive option for mobile (better off) households, with shorter expected 
durations in their properties.  
In places with elastic housing supply (lax land use controls), we hypothesize that the 
positive impact of the MID may vary by income status, although the direction of the effect is not 
clear a priori.  Higher income households are the primary beneficiaries of the MID as they are 
both more likely to itemize and have higher valued homes (Poterba and Sinai, 2008), thus it may 
be that the impact of the MID where it exists will be greater for higher income households.  On 
the other hand, higher income households are believed to have a probability of homeownership 
that is more price inelastic than lower income households (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002), 
suggesting that their homeownership decision will be unresponsive to changes in the MID, and, 
as a result, to the extent that an effect is observed, it will be observed in the homeownership 
decisions of lower income households. 
We investigate these issues using longitudinal household data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1984 to 2007, as well as various secondary data sources.  
Specifically, we examine the impact of the combined state and federal MID on homeownership 
attainment, allowing for the possibility that the value of these subsidies varies by income group, 
over time, and by local housing market conditions.  We test our proposition that the 
capitalization of the MID into higher house prices offsets the positive effect of the MID on 
homeownership attainment by exploiting data on regulatory restrictiveness in the late 
1970s/early 1980s (compiled by Saks, 2008) as a proxy for the inelasticity of local housing 
supply.   
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As a preview of our findings: controlling for household, MSA, state and year fixed 
effects and state time trends as well as time-varying household and location characteristics, we 
find that the MID, on average, has no discernible impact on U.S. homeownership outcomes.  
Allowing the impact of the MID to vary by regulatory and income status, we find that only in 
markets with lax land use regulation does the MID have a positive impact on homeownership 
attainment, and the positive effect of the MID occurs only for higher income households.  The 
MID has an adverse impact on the homeownership attainment of households residing in tightly 
regulated housing markets.  In these places the MID reduces the likelihood of homeownership 
for all income groups except the lowest.  The homeownership attainment of low-income 
households is unaffected by the MID regardless of the regulatory status of the city in which they 
reside.  Our simulations suggest that a lower bound of the subsidy cost per converted homeowner 
amounts to a staggering $53,590.  Overall, our findings cast serious doubt on the benefits of the 
mortgage interest deduction as a policy for boosting homeownership rates, particularly in more 
urbanized places and among low income and minority households, who tend to live in the more 
urbanized places. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses related research.  
Section 3 provides a discussion of the implication of economic theory for the impact of tax 
subsidies on homeownership attainment.  Section 4 details the data and sample issues, outlines 
our empirical approach, presents our empirical findings and discusses the quantitative 
significance.  Section 5 concludes. 
2 Related research 
A voluminous literature recognizes the importance of taking into account federal tax 
policy when constructing the user cost of owner-occupied housing (e.g., Rosen, 1979; Dynarski 
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and Sheffrin, 1985; Poterba, 1992; Turner and Smith, 2009).  Early efforts to determine the 
impacts of removing the preferential tax treatment of owner occupied housing on 
homeownership attainment include papers by Rosen (1979), Hendershott and Shilling (1980), 
Rosen et al. (1984) and Berkovec and Fullerton (1994) and, although the findings are not entirely 
conclusive, they suggest that the tenure choice impacts of removing the mortgage interest 
deduction in isolation of other tax changes are likely to be small.   
Several studies highlight the need to consider housing supply elasticities when examining 
the housing market impacts of tax reform (Capozza et al., 1996; Green and Vandell, 1999).  
Capozza et al. (1996) maintain that the stock of prime residential land is inelastic, and thus 
altering the current tax treatment of owner-occupied housing will have price rather than quantity 
effects.  In an examination of rent-price ratios in 63 metropolitan areas, Capozza et al. conclude 
that eliminating the mortgage interest and property tax deduction would reduce house prices by 2 
percent to 13 percent depending on the metropolitan area.  Using the Public Use Microdata 
Sample of the 1990 Census, Green and Vandell (1999) examine the likelihood of 
homeownership, controlling for state fixed effects in an effort to adjust for differing supply 
elasticities across states and find that replacing the MID with a revenue neutral tax credit would 
boost the national homeownership rate by about 5 percentage points.   
Several papers document that the distribution of (primarily) federal housing tax benefits 
favors young and higher income homeowners and homeowners residing in regions with high 
incomes and high house prices (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002; Sinai and Gyourko, 2004; Poterba 
and Sinai, 2008).  However, high income households also tend to be higher wealth households 
and therefore they are likely to use equity financing to purchase their homes in the absence of the 
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mortgage interest deduction (Gervais and Pandey, 2008), thus further suggesting that the MID 
may have little impact on homeownership attainment.   
Two papers broach the subject of state mortgage subsidies.  Consistent with Capozza et 
al.’s (1996) finding that the tax subsidies to homeowners primarily generate price effects, 
Bourassa and Min (2008) find that the combined state and federal mortgage interest deduction 
has an adverse effect on homeownership attainment of the young.  In contrast, in an examination 
of state mortgage subsidies, Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) report that state homeownership rates 
are unrelated to the size of state subsidies (p. 40).  Taken as a whole, existing research suggests 
that the MID may not be a particularly effective policy tool for boosting homeownership 
attainment.  However, to our knowledge, no study to date has sorted out the extent to which the 
MID impacts may vary depending on local housing supply conditions, a task we turn to next. 
3 Capitalization and the homeownership rate 
Our theoretical predictions are straightforward.  Tax subsidies to owner-occupied housing 
will increase demand for owner-occupied housing, all else equal.  However, the degree to which 
tax subsidies benefits households depends upon the local elasticity of housing supply and likely 
differs by income as different income tax brackets are differentially affected.  To see the 
importance of the supply elasticity, consider the standard model of housing market dynamics.6  
In the short run, the consumer’s willingness to pay for new or expanded housing increases 
according to the present discounted value of the tax subsidy.  The stock of housing is fixed in the 
very short run, thus the tax policy results in disequilibria in the housing market, and, depending 
on the extent to which a supply side adjustment is expected, the price of housing in the short run 
may rise by the full amount of the present discounted value of the tax subsidy. 
                                                            
6 Based on Poterba (1980). 
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In response to the demand-side housing market shock, the quantity supplied of owner-
occupied housing may increase along two dimensions: New construction and conversion of 
rental units into owner-occupied units.  At one extreme, if the long run supply of owner-occupied 
housing is perfectly elastic (very lax land use controls and no scarcity of developable land), the 
equilibrium purchase price of housing will return to its pre-tax change level.  The subsidy in this 
case results in an expanded housing stock, an increased homeownership rate, zero capitalization 
and a lower user cost of owner-occupied housing.  At the other extreme, if the owner-occupied 
housing stock is perfectly inelastic (very tight regulatory constraints and/or no open land to 
build), the subsidy is fully capitalized into the purchase price of owner-occupied housing, the 
owner-occupied housing stock does not expand, and the subsidy does not increase the 
homeownership rate, although it likely changes the composition of owners.  The user cost of 
owner-occupied housing is unchanged. 
There is ample evidence that indices of the restrictiveness of land use regulation are good 
proxies for the housing supply elasticity and thus for the potential for expansion of owner-
occupied housing through new construction.  For example, Saks (2008) derives a ‘combined’ 
measure of regulatory restrictiveness for the late 1970s and early 1980s (by using information 
from a number of surveys, see Saks (2008) for details) to demonstrate that locations with 
relatively few barriers to construction experience more residential construction and smaller 
increases in house prices in response to an increase in housing demand.  Furthermore, housing 
supply constraints alter local employment and wage dynamics in locations where the degree of 
regulation is more severe.  Quigley and Raphael (2005) use a city-level index of regulatory 
stringency for California cities and relate this index to local house prices in 1990 and 2000. They 
document, consistent with the findings in Saks (2008) and in this paper, that more regulated 
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cities have more expensive housing and a slower growth in housing stock. They confirm that 
these more regulated places also have a lower price elasticity of housing supply.  Finally, Saiz 
(2010) uses a current measure of regulatory restrictiveness – the Wharton regulatory index that 
captures the restrictiveness of regulation around 2005 – and relates this directly to measures of 
supply elasticity, demonstrating that more regulated metro areas have more inelastic supply.  In 
our empirical analysis we use the regulatory index compiled by Saks, since the regulatory 
stringency in the late 1970s / early 1980s is exogenous to (and not determined by) subsequent 
changes in tax policies and subsequent housing tenure decisions. (In contrast, the Wharton 
regulatory index from around 2005 and other recent measures of regulation are plausibly 
endogenous to prior changes in tax policies and in homeownership rates.)  
As we use the regulatory index compiled by Saks (2008) in our analysis, her finding that 
in more strictly regulated metro areas house prices respond more strongly to changes in housing 
demand is particularly reassuring, as it supports our implicit assumption that in more tightly 
regulated places (defined as in our study) the extent of capitalization of demand factors – e.g., 
the mortgage subsidy – is greater. In a further attempt to confirm our implicit assumption that 
house price capitalization effects are greater in more tightly regulated places, we conduct a 
simple test of the proposition that regulatory restrictiveness affects the extent to which the 
mortgage subsidy rate raises house prices within our sample.  Table A1 in the Appendix reports 
the results of regressing the house-price appreciation rate on the percentage change in the 
mortgage subsidy rate, controlling for year, state and MSA fixed effects.  The results confirm 
that more regulated places have a greater extent of capitalization of the mortgage subsidy rate: 
greater increases in the mortgage subsidy are associated with higher house prices, and this effect 
is more than twice as large for the more regulated half of the observations in our sample. While 
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this is a preliminary and rather coarse look at capitalization, it is suggestive. It is also worth 
noting that other studies (e.g., Quigley and Raphael, 2005, for the US; Hilber and Vermeulen, 
2010, for the UK) that use different measures to proxy for regulatory stringency also come to the 
same conclusion; house prices react more strongly to demand shocks (i.e., the extent of house 
price capitalization is greater) in more tightly regulated markets and hence, all else equal, 
housing is more expensive in those markets. Finally, in addition to the regulatory control, the 
homeownership specifications control for housing stock composition in the census tracts in 
which the households reside in order to capture at least in part the other aspect of housing supply 
elasticity: the extent to which the existing rental stock can be converted to owner-occupied use.  
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1  Data and sample issues 
 This paper uses data from multiple sources.  The primary data source is three decades of 
data from the ‘confidential version’ of the PSID, which is a longitudinal survey of families – from 
whom we (confidentially) know their Census tract of residence – that has been carried out 
continuously since 1968 and provides a unique opportunity to follow households over time and 
across space.7  We select all PSID households observed from 1984 to 2007.  We begin the panel in 
1984 because this is the first year in which the PSID collects information on the household wealth 
holdings.  Data are collected annually until 1997 and biennially after 1997, providing up to 19 
observations per household.8  The data include (i) the original 1968 PSID core sample of 5,000 
households selected as a random cross-section sample of the U.S. population with an additional 
low-income sample, and (ii) persons living within a household unit that enter the sample as a 
                                                            
7 The PSID tract and MSA location indicators are confidential data from the PSID GEOCODE data files and can be 
obtained from the PSID under special contract.  These data are not available from the authors.   
8 Due to missing data, we allow for a slightly unbalanced panel in our analysis in order to include the greatest number of 
households.  Most households are included from 1984 to 2007. 
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separate household when they form their own household.  The PSID reconstituted its sample in 
1997 by dropping 1/3 of the core sample, changing to biennial data collection, and reformatting 
sample weights.  Thus, our sample includes only those households observed from 1984 through 
2007, roughly 2/3 of the original core sample.  All of the household data used in this study are 
collected in each year of observation, except wealth data.  Prior to 1997, the wealth data are 
collected every 5 years.  After 1997, they are collected with each survey.  For the pre-1997 wealth 
data, we apply a linear function to impute annual estimates of total net wealth.   
 In addition to the ‘confidential version’ of the PSID, we use five secondary data sources that 
report data at the tract, metro area or state level: NBER mortgage subsidy data, Federal Housing 
Finance Board mortgage interest rate data, Federal Housing Finance Authority house price indexes, 
1980 U.S. Census data on tract-level housing stock characteristics, and the regulatory restrictiveness 
index from Saks (2008). We link these data to PSID households using PSID geographic location 
data.  Our key variable of interest, the subsidy to homeowners through use of the federal and state 
mortgage interest deductions, comes from the NBER publicly available data on tax rates.  The 
NBER generates the mortgage subsidy data by simulating the effects of the U.S. federal and state 
tax systems using SOI micro data on individual tax returns.  As detailed in Feenberg and Coutts 
(1993) and at http://www.nber.org/taxsim, the mortgage interest subsidy is calculated as follows.  
State and federal income tax liabilities owed by a large sample of taxpayers in each state in each 
year are calculated.  The mortgage interest is then increased by 1 percent for each taxpayer, the state 
and federal taxes are recalculated, and the mortgage interest subsidy is generated as the ratio of the 
additional tax (savings) to the additional mortgage interest.  It measures the tax savings from an 
additional dollar of mortgage interest, or, equivalently, it is the marginal subsidy rate on mortgage 
interest.  The average mortgage interest subsidy is then computed by state and year, using a fixed 
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sample of taxpayers across time so that year to year changes in the mortgage subsidy reflect only 
changes in tax law and not changes in the income distribution.  The property tax subsidy is similarly 
generated.  Importantly, using the marginal subsidy to the average taxpayer in the state in which the 
PSID household resides (varying in each year from 1984 to 2007) provides an exogenous measure 
of the mortgage interest subsidy for our analysis. 
 We use publicly available data from the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) on 
metropolitan and state average effective mortgage interest rates at the time of mortgage 
origination for conventional, single-family, non-farm loans.  The data are from the FHFB 
Monthly Interest Rate Survey and are computed based on fully amortized loans.  Refinances, 
non-amortized loans, and balloon loans are excluded from the FHFB data, as are non-
conventional loans (www.fhfb.gov).  We use metro area data where available and state level data 
for PSID households that are not residing in one of the FHFB reported metro areas.  The 
effective mortgage interest rate is the contracted rate adjusted for fees and charges.  We use the 
mortgage interest rate data as part of the user cost controls in a robustness check of our main 
specifications.  
 The house price appreciation data, used in this study in Table A1 as well as in 
specifications controlling for the relative cost of homeownership, come from the Federal 
Housing Finance Authority (FHFA), formerly known as Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
and Oversight.  FHFA produces public use house price indexes at the metropolitan and state 
level using a repeat sales methodology and data on single-family properties whose loans have 
been purchased or securitized by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae over the years (see www.fhfa.gov).  
As with the FHFB data, we use the metro level indexes where available and the state level 
indexes for households that are not residing in one of the FHFA metro areas.  Finally, as noted 
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previously, we use the metropolitan-level regulatory index generated by Saks (2008) as a 
measure of the housing supply inelasticity. The ‘Saks index’ is scaled to have a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. The index is available for 83 metro areas; generally regulation is tightest 
in the larger coastal cities – with New York and San Francisco being the two most regulated 
metro areas. Places in the Midwest and the South typically have rather relaxed land use controls. 
 To control for location specific factors that affect homeownership, we merge 1980 U.S. 
Census data on the composition of the housing stock at the tract level to the PSID households.  
The specific variables we examine include the share of housing units in the tract that are single-
family and the share of units that are in multiplexes (structures with 5 or more units).  We use the 
1980 composition of the housing stock as it will be exogenous in an analysis of the probability of 
homeownership post 1980.  The sample includes 4,197 households corresponding to 53,279 
household-year observations residing in metropolitan and non-metro areas for the base empirical 
specifications, and 2,620 households corresponding to 29,621 household-year observations 
residing in metropolitan areas for which we have Saks (2008) regulatory index data.  Roughly 
2.5 percent of households move to a different state and 4 percent of households move to a 
different MSA in any given year.  All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2007 dollars using the urban 
Consumer Price Index.  All analysis is weighted using the PSID 2005 sample weights.9 
4.2 Empirical approach 
We estimate the following base specification for household i at time t (in location j) as a 
linear probability model: 
  0 1Pr ' ' 'it it it it i iown mrs X L D e          ,     (1) 
                                                            
9 The PSID sample is not representative of the U.S. population without the application of sample weights.  The post-
1997 weights are stratified to the U.S. population according to data from the Current Population Survey.  See Heeringa 
and Connor (1999) for more discussion.  We use the 2005 combined family weight because the more recent 2007 weight 
is preliminary and not available for as many households as the 2005 weight. 
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where mrs is the mortgage subsidy rate, which is expected to have a positive coefficient to the 
extent that it facilitates homeownership, X is a vector of household characteristics that vary over 
time, L is a vector of location characteristics that vary over time as households move locations, D 
is a vector of individual fixed effects.  The vector of time-varying household characteristics 
includes controls for total family income, total net wealth, age of head, marital status, children, 
and unemployment of head and spouse if present.  We control for income by use of three income 
categories: low, moderate or high income.  A low-income household is one whose annual income 
is less than or equal to 80 percent of state median income; moderate-income households include 
households with incomes between 80 and 120 percent of state median income, and high-income 
households are those with incomes above 120 percent of state median income.10  The vector of 
time-varying location characteristics includes tract-level housing stock controls (the share of 
housing units that are single family units and the share of housing units in multiplexes), MSA 
fixed effects and state fixed effects.  The rationale for including both MSA- and state fixed 
effects is that not all households reside in MSAs.  The state fixed effects provide location 
controls for those places. Also, there could be unobservable time-invariant effects at the MSA 
and state level.  We also estimate equation (1) with state time trends to control for unobserved 
factors at the state level that may affect homeownership attainment and may be changing over 
time.  We estimate (1) with a household cluster correction.  This implies that the standard errors 
allow for intra-household correlation, relaxing the usual requirement that the observations are 
independent. That is, the observations are independent across groups (clusters) but not 
                                                            
10 We use state median income data from the U.S. Census Bureau Table H-7, which provides annual median income 
estimates by state from 1984 to 2007, based on the Current Population Survey.  Regarding the income classifications, 
note that state homeownership assistance programs, such as Florida's State Housing Initiatives Partnership Program 
(SHIP), the largest state housing trust fund, use these income definitions.  For example, see 
http://www.floridahousing.org/Home/HousingPartners/LocalGovernments.  The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s HOME program, which supports homeownership, defines low income as 80% of MSA median income. 
(http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/lawsandregs/index.cfm).  Nelson (1994) defines 50% as very low 
income and 80% as low income. 
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necessarily within groups. As noted previously, PSID households do move across MSAs and 
across states. Hence, there is variation in our MSA-specific as well as in our state-specific 
measures.  We also run specifications that allow for a differential impact of tax subsidies 
depending on the household’s income by interacting mrs with income status. 
One advantage of estimating equation (1) as a fixed effect model is that household fixed 
effects capture all unobserved heterogeneity in household characteristics – such as race/ethnicity 
of the household head – that are time invariant. To the extent that households don’t move, the 
fixed effects also capture time invariant location characteristics (at neighborhood-, municipality-, 
county-, state-, region-, and national-level).  However, households do move across space and we 
observe such changes in our panel.  As a result, we also include the location controls discussed 
above.  Regarding total net wealth, note that changes in net asset wealth are driven in part by 
changes in income.  Hence, once we control for fixed effects and household income, the impact 
of household net wealth on homeownership attainment can be expected to be quite limited.   
To explore the impact of regulatory restrictiveness, we also estimate the following 
specification for household i at time t (in location j), again, as a linear probability model: 
  0 1 2 3Pr * ' ' 'it it it it it it it i iown mrs mrs reg reg X L D e              , (2) 
where reg equals the value of the regulatory index with higher values of the index indicating 
greater regulatory restrictiveness and hence more inelastic housing supply.  Economic theory 
suggests that α2 < 0: the positive impact of the subsidy on homeownership attainment ought to be 
weaker (and the negative impact stronger) in more regulated metro areas.  Note that itreg  varies 
in the panel even though our regulatory proxy is time-invariant and only varies by location.  This 
is because itreg  varies as households move between metro areas or states and thereby move from 
more to less restrictive places and vice versa.  We also run specifications that interact regulatory 
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status, mrs, and income status in order to investigate the extent to which different income groups 
are differentially affected by the mortgage rate subsidy in different regulatory environments.  
Missing from the analysis so far is a control for the relative cost of homeownership: the 
cost of housing services in the owner mode relative to the cost of housing services in the rental 
mode.  In studies of homeownership, the annual cost of housing services in the owner mode is 
generally approximated as the user cost of housing, which is a household–specific variable 
measuring the expected consumption value of the housing services from purchasing a home. The 
user cost is the sum of depreciation and maintenance costs, the after-tax opportunity cost of the 
down-payment, the after-tax mortgage interest payments and after-tax property tax payments 
minus the expected, nominal capital gain on the housing structure (Poterba, 1980).  Of these 
components of user cost, equations (1) and (2) control for the mortgage interest tax break using 
the NBER SOI data (mrs).  We also run these models adding controls for additional determinants 
of user cost: the FHFB reported effective mortgage interest rate, the NBER property tax subsidy 
rate and the FHFA contemporaneous house price appreciation rate as well as the price of rental 
housing, which we control for as the average annual rent in the city and year in which the family 
is observed.11 
4.3  Results  
Table 1 presents population weighted summary statistics for the full sample and the 
regulatory restrictiveness sub-sample.  Table 2 provides detailed summary statistics for our key 
variable of interest, the mortgage subsidy, by state.  While our econometric analysis uses the 
combined federal and state mortgage subsidy rate, we also report the net state rate to illustrate 
                                                            
11 The remaining terms in UC, depreciation and maintenance, are each typically set to a value of 0.02 (see e.g. Poterba, 
1992), and thus would be part of the constant in an estimation.  For the rent data, we compute the average self-reported 
rent in the PSID in the city and year in which we observe the household.  For households residing in non-metropolitan 
areas or metropolitan areas with a relatively small sample size (less than 100 PSID respondents), we compute a regional 
rent based on the metropolitan areas being located in one of the nine Census Divisions. 
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the extent to which there is across and within state variation in the net state mortgage subsidy.  
As can be seen from Table 2, 15 states provide no state level mortgage subsidy.  Among the 
states that do provide a mortgage subsidy, the rate varies considerable across states, reaching a 
maximum of 10 cents per dollar of mortgage interest in the District of Columbia, as well as 
within states over time. 
Table 3 reports the results for the baseline estimations on the full PSID sample.  Column 
(1) provides results for the specification that includes only the mrs, household controls, and 
household fixed effects.  Column (2) then adds locations controls (the housing stock variables, 
MSA fixed effects and state fixed effects).  Column (3) adds year fixed effects, and column (4) 
adds state time trends.  Column (5) allows for separate effects of mrs by income group.  Across 
all five specifications, the key variable of interest, the mrs, has no statistically significant impact 
on the likelihood of homeownership, not even for the highest income households, in column (5), 
who tend to receive the greatest tax breaks from this feature of the tax code.  This result is 
consistent with Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) and suggests that, on aggregate, this very costly tax 
subsidy to U.S. homeowners has no discernible impact on the likelihood of homeownership 
attainment. 
The control variables all generate results that are sensible, intuitive and robust across all 
models.  Income, wealth, age, being married and having children all positively impact the 
likelihood of homeownership, with income and being married having particularly large impacts: 
based on the coefficients reported in column (4), high-income households are roughly 14 
percentage points more likely to own than low-income households; being married increases the 
likelihood of homeownership by 17.3 percentage points.  An episode of head or spouse 
unemployment lowers the likelihood of homeownership by roughly 4 percentage points.  The 
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location controls indicate that the composition of the housing stock matters for homeownership 
attainment: a greater fraction of single family units boosts homeownership attainment whereas a 
greater fraction of multiplexes lowers it. 
Table 4 reports results for specifications where the mrs is interacted with regulatory 
tightness and with income status.  Our proposition is that in more regulated places (with inelastic 
supply), the tax subsidies get capitalized into house values rather than expand the (owner-
occupied) housing stock and thereby have little impact on homeownership attainment, or, may in 
fact have a negative impact, for example, because fewer moderate income households ‘at the 
margin’ manage to qualify for a mortgage or because owning may become comparably less 
attractive for mobile (better-off) households with short expected durations in their homes.  
Columns (1) and (2) allow for the impact of the mrs to vary by regulatory restrictiveness on the 
full sample for which we have regulatory data, with column (2) adding in state time trends.  
Column (3) further decomposes the impact of the mrs on homeownership attainment by 
interacting the subsidy with regulatory restrictiveness and with income status.   
Columns (1) and (2) indicate that the mrs has no statistically significant impact on the 
likelihood of owning if a household lives in a metro area with an average degree of regulatory 
restrictiveness. If a household lives in a place with relaxed land use controls the mrs will have a 
positive impact on homeownership attainment, whereas the effect is negative in more tightly 
constrained locations, in line with our theoretical conjectures.  According to column (2), 
evaluating the regulatory index at its sample mean of 0.191 suggests that the marginal effect of a 
one standard deviation increase in the mrs is negligible, decreasing the homeownership rate by 
0.1 percentage point.  Evaluating the regulatory index at its extreme values of -2.4 
(Bloomington-Normal, IL) and 2.21 (New York, NY) generates the following range: a one 
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standard deviation increase in the mrs increases the likelihood of homeownership attainment by 
3.6 percentage points in the least regulated place and reduces the likelihood of homeownership 
by 3 percentage points in the most tightly regulated place. 
Referring to column (3), we see that a further decomposition is insightful.  It reveals that 
the impact of the subsidy on homeownership attainment by regulatory status varies considerably 
by income status.  Very few low income households itemize and this is apparent in the 
estimations, whereby the subsidy has no effect on the likelihood that low-income households will 
attain homeownership, regardless of the regulatory status of the city in which they reside.12  The 
coefficients on the interaction terms for moderate- and high-income households are statistically 
significant and meaningful.  Evaluating the regulatory index at its extreme values generates the 
following range for moderate-income households: a one standard deviation increase in the mrs 
increases the likelihood of homeownership attainment by 3.6 percentage points in the least 
regulated location and reduces it by 3.7 percentage points in the most tightly regulated place.  
For high-income households, the impact of a one standard deviation increase in the mortgage 
subsidy on the likelihood of homeownership ranges from a 4.9 percentage point increase (least 
restrictive) to a reduction of 3.4 percentage points (most restrictive). Regarding the other results 
from Table 4, the household and location controls continue to be intuitive, plausible and robust 
across samples and specifications; the coefficient estimates are available from the authors upon 
request. 
Finally, as a robustness check, we re-estimate the specifications in Table 4 controlling for 
additional components of user cost: the NBER combined state and federal property tax subsidy 
                                                            
12 Even among low-income homeowners itemization rates are low.  For example, using 2004 data from the Survey of 
Finances combined with NBER TAXSIM data, Poterba and Sinai (2008) report in their Table 2 that only 23 percent of 
low-income homeowners (those earning less than $40K in 2003) itemize whereas over 98% of high income homeowners 
do (those earning $125K or more). 
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rate, the FHFB effective mortgage rate, and the FHFA metropolitan house price appreciation rate 
as well as the price of rental housing.  The results are reported in the Appendix Table A2.  The 
additional controls have a negligible impact on our key findings.  Of the controls, only the 
coefficient on rent is statistically significant and suggests that a one standard deviation increase 
in local rents ($1,565), holding the user cost of owner-occupied housing constant, increases the 
likelihood of homeownership by 1.7 percentage points.  We should interpret these findings with 
some caution however as both additional controls are subject to endogeneity concerns. The 
property tax rate is affected by house prices; places with greater housing wealth can set lower 
property tax rates, all else equal, and can still offer better local public services. At the same time 
an increase in the local homeownership rate may cause higher prices for owner-occupied 
housing.  Hence homeownership may affect property tax rates via house prices, that is, reverse 
causation may be present.  In a similar vein, if the homeownership rate increases, demand for 
mortgage credit strengthens as well. This in turn can raise mortgage interest rates. Again, reverse 
causation may be present. For all these reasons we only report these results as an Appendix 
Table rather than as our main specifications. 
4.4  Quantitative effects 
One way to gauge the cost of the MID is to compute the cost per net new homeowner 
created by the MID.  To do so, we first determine the net number of households that are 
hypothetically moved into homeownership as a result of the mortgage interest subsidy.  Using 
the specifications in Tables 3 and 4, we compute the probability of homeownership for each 
household with and without the mortgage subsidy.  If in a given year the subsidy moves a 
household from a less than 50 percent likelihood of homeownership to a likelihood that exceeds 
50 percent, the household is counted as moving from renting to owning.  If the household’s 
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likelihood of homeownership decreases from above 50 percent to less than 50 percent as a result 
of the subsidy, this household is counted as moving from owning to renting.  If the household 
does not experience a change in the likelihood of homeownership that crosses the 50 percent 
threshold, the household is counted as not having experienced a change in its housing status. 
We then compute the fraction of the sample that falls into each category: moving from 
renting to owning, moving from owning to renting, or having no change in tenure status.   The 
net impact is computed as the percent of the sample moved into homeownership minus the 
percent of the sample moved out of homeownership, as defined above, as a result of the MID.  
Table 5 reports these results by specification.  Notice that for the U.S. on average, based on the 
econometric results in Table 3, this exercise suggests a net negative impact of the MID on the 
likelihood of homeownership (although the effects are all not statistically significant), whereas 
the specifications reported in Table 4 imply a relatively small positive (and statistically 
significant) impact. Our most refined specification reported in column (3) of Table 4, which 
allows the impact of the MID to vary by regulatory restrictiveness and by income status, results 
in a net positive gain in the number of homeowners by 1.7 percent, and this is the estimate we 
proceed with to compute the subsidy cost per net additional homeowner. 
There are an estimated 115 million households in the US in 2010 (the most recent Census 
Bureau estimate available).13  Hence, specification (3) in Table 4 implies that the subsidy in any 
given year generates 1.95 millions new homeowners in the United States (1.7 percent times 115 
million).  At an estimated total cost of 104.5 billion in 2011 (OMB, 2010), the subsidy per 
converted homeowner thus amounts to a staggering $53,590.  That is, to move a renter household 
into homeownership through the MID costs US taxpayers $53,590 in foregone tax revenue 
                                                            
13 See www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/hh-fam/table1n.txt. 
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annually. This amount is likely a lower bound estimate. The other rigorous specification in Table 
4 that includes state time-trends (column 2) implies an amount of $75,920. The (non-significant) 
coefficients on the MID-variable reported in the various specifications in Table 3 – if taken at 
face value – all imply that the tax payer may spend 104.5 billion in 2011 with the overall net 
effect being that fewer households own, as a consequence of the MID. More importantly, the 
amount may be a lower bound because ‘inertia’ or moving costs may prevent households from 
changing their tenure status, even if it were per se optimal to do so. This is because the moving 
cost may exceed the gains associated with the tenure change. In practice, most households will 
only question their optimal tenure status when they have to relocate for other reasons. Hence, the 
net addition of homeowners, as a consequence of the MID, may only be a small fraction of the 
1.95 millions that our simulation implies. To the extent this is true; the subsidy per converted 
homeowner may be a multiple of $53,590.  
5 Conclusions 
 Using multiple data sources in the context of a fixed effects household-level analysis, this 
paper provides a first look at the impact of the combined state and federal mortgage interest tax 
subsidy on homeownership attainment taking into account housing supply conditions via 
measures of regulatory restrictiveness in local housing markets.  Controlling for household, 
MSA, state and year fixed effects as well as state time trends and time-varying household and 
location characteristics, we find that, on average, the MID has no statistically significant impact 
on homeownership attainment.  However, the MID does have an impact on individual 
homeownership decisions – both positive and negative – depending on the restrictiveness of land 
use regulations at the place of residence and the income status of the household: in places with 
more elastic housing supply, the MID has a positive effect on homeownership attainment, but 
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only for higher income groups, increasing their likelihood of homeownership by about 3.6 to 5 
percentage points depending on income status, with the effect being stronger for high-income 
than moderate-income households.  In contrast, regardless of regulatory status, the MID has no 
impact on the homeownership attainment of low-income households.  In more restrictive places, 
the mortgage tax subsidies have a significant adverse impact: they reduce the likelihood of 
homeownership, with this effect being slightly more negative for moderate-income households  
(-3.7 percentage points) than high-income households (-3.4 percentage points).  
The implications of the MID for redistribution are striking. The fact that the subsidies 
have an adverse effect on homeownership attainment in the more regulated markets, implies that 
an increase in the subsidy rate only serves to make existing (typically higher-income) 
homeowners better off and existing (usually lower-income) renters worse off.  In less regulated 
places we do find the intended tenure transitions but, again, only for the higher income groups.   
The implications from a welfare economics point of view are similarly striking. One 
argument in favor of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest is that it may help to increase 
homeownership attainment in highly urbanized (inner city) areas.  These areas are often 
confronted with underperforming public schools, lack of social capital and poor governance and 
recent research has highlighted that positive externalities associated with homeownership may 
help local communities to improve along those dimensions (Hoff and Sen, 2005; DiPasquale and 
Glaeser, 1999; Hilber and Mayer, 2009; Fischel, 2001). However, our research suggests that the 
deductibility of mortgage interest decreases rather than increases homeownership attainment in 
the typically more tightly regulated urbanized places.  What about the less urbanized places with 
lax land use controls? In these places the MID does have a positive impact on homeownership 
attainment (at least for higher income groups). However, recent research (Hilber and Mayer 2009 
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and Hilber 2010) suggests that in these ‘elastically supplied’ places homeownership may 
generate few or no positive externalities.14 We conclude that the MID is a costly and ineffectual 
policy for boosting homeownership and social welfare. 
                                                            
14 Hilber and Mayer (2009) suggest that the positive externalities of homeownership related to investment in local 
public schools may be confined to places with inelastic supply of housing. In a similar vein, Hilber (2010) provides 
evidence that homeowners may only be ‘better citizens’ (i.e., invest in local social capital) in neighborhoods with 
inelastic housing supply.  
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TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
Population Weighted Summary Statistics: PSID Households 1984 to 2007 
 
Full regression sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Owner-occupier = yes 53279 0.716 0.451 0 1 
TAXSIM mortgage rate subsidy (absolute) 53279 0.260 0.0284 0.187 0.405 
Household income in 2007 US-$10,000 53279 8.29 10.20 0 583.91 
Household has low income 53279 0.234 0.423 0 1 
 moderate income 53279 0.190 0.392 0 1 
 high income 53279 0.576 0.494 0 1 
Age of household head 53279 45.10 13.51 0 97 
Married 53279 0.643 0.479 0 1 
One child 53279 0.176 0.380 0 1 
Two children 53279 0.173 0.379 0 1 
Three or more children 53279 0.0917 0.289 0 1 
Head in labor force and unemployed last year 53279 0.0802 0.272 0 1 
Wife in labor force and unemployed last year 53279 0.0317 0.175 0 1 
Share units in tract that are single family 53279 0.648 0.243 0 1 
Share units in tract in apartment b. (5+ units) 53279 0.155 0.191 0 1 
Total net wealth in 2007 US-$1 million 53279 0.331 1.21 -1.30 50.48 
Year of observation 53279 1994.27 6.88 1984 2007 
Sample of observations with MSA-level information on regulatory restrictiveness 
Owner-occupier = yes 29621 0.694 0.461 0 1 
TAXSIM mortgage rate subsidy (absolute) 29621 0.261 0.0293 0.194 0.405 
Household income in 2007 US-$10,000 29621 9.06 11.26 0 583.91 
Household has low income 29621 0.218 0.413 0 1 
 moderate income 29621 0.170 0.376 0 1 
 high income 29621 0.612 0.487 0 1 
Age of household head 29621 45.08 13.46 18 96 
Married 29621 0.621 0.485 0 1 
One child 29621 0.173 0.379 0 1 
Two children 29621 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Three or more children 29621 0.0863 0.281 0 1 
Head in labor force and unemployed last year 29621 0.0764 0.266 0 1 
Wife in labor force and unemployed last year 29621 0.0276 0.164 0 1 
Share units in tract that are single family 29621 0.617 0.279 0 1 
Share units in tract in apartment b. (5+ units) 29621 0.194 0.225 0 1 
Total net wealth in 2007 US-$1 million 29621 0.353 1.27 -1.30 50.48 
Year of observation 29621 1994.16 6.94 1984 2007 
Regulatory index compiled by Saks (2008) 29621 0.191 0.985 -2.40 2.21 
TAXSIM property tax rate subsidy 29621 0.254 0.0419 0.161 0.501 
Effective mortgage interest rate 29621 0.0836 0.0187 0.0543 0.132 
House price appreciation rate (only years w/o move) 29621 0.0363 0.0474 -0.174 0.276 
Av. annual rent in MSA/region in 2007 US-$10,000 29621 0.698 0.161 0.351 1.34 
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TABLE 2 
NBER SOI Mortgage Rate Subsidy by U.S. State in %, 1984-2007 (PSID Sample Years Only) 
 
U.S. State 
Average of 
State Net 
MRS 
Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Average of 
Combined 
MRS 
Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
ALABAMA  3.56 0.12 3.29 3.72 25.19 2.10 22.8 29.37 
ALASKA  0 0 0 0 26.92 3.10 23.21 33.3 
ARIZONA  4.21 0.86 3.37 5.61 26.14 2.11 23.19 30.51 
ARKANSAS  5.46 0.83 3.81 6.43 28.26 1.62 25.95 31.22 
CALIFORNIA  6.01 0.32 5.43 6.54 26.67 1.41 24.94 29.48 
COLORADO  4.71 0.27 4.44 5.28 27.08 2.07 24.55 31.48 
CONNECTICUT  0.06 0.07 0 0.22 25.60 2.45 22.89 30.55 
DELAWARE  6.41 0.87 5.1 8.56 27.37 2.21 24.06 31.95 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  8.98 0.56 7.94 10.17 34.68 2.60 32.36 40.48 
FLORIDA  0 0 0 0 22.97 2.14 20.15 27.22 
GEORGIA  5.32 0.11 5.21 5.56 27.78 2.26 25.32 32.68 
HAWAII  8.86 0.67 7.57 9.46 28.20 1.75 25.31 31.83 
IDAHO  5.74 0.37 4.96 6.56 25.81 2.22 22.76 29.71 
ILLINOIS  0 0 0 0 24.50 2.37 21.73 29.48 
INDIANA  0 0 0 0 23.62 2.35 20.26 28.11 
IOWA  5.59 0.21 5.25 5.81 27.63 2.03 25.1 31.93 
KANSAS  5.33 0.84 3.07 6.19 28.83 2.33 25.85 33.66 
KENTUCKY  5.26 0.72 3.96 5.83 27.80 1.93 25.63 31.4 
LOUISIANA  2.23 1.37 -1.45 3.08 26.78 2.71 21.74 31.23 
MAINE  7.28 0.36 6.31 7.78 28.13 1.79 25.98 31.53 
MARYLAND  3.89 1.70 0.06 4.69 26.49 0.97 24.56 28.08 
MASSACHUSETTS  0 0 0 0 24.18 2.12 21.65 28.74 
MICHIGAN  0 0 0 0 25.03 2.42 21.93 29.94 
MINNESOTA  7.05 1.08 5.34 9.59 29.40 3.36 25.05 37.39 
MISSISSIPPI  4.04 0.31 3.47 4.53 27.80 1.67 25.22 31.08 
MISSOURI  4.19 0.53 3.38 4.93 27.26 1.84 24.95 30.58 
MONTANA  5.25 0.86 3.56 6.19 26.12 1.93 24.13 29.59 
NEBRASKA  5.02 0.52 4.17 6.3 27.05 1.82 25.09 30.79 
NEVADA  0 0 0 0 24.23 1.90 21.77 28.11 
NEW HAMPSHIRE  0 0 0 0 23.00 2.08 20.49 27.46 
NEW JERSEY 0 0 0 0 24.70 2.29 22.2 29.68 
NEW MEXICO  5.29 0.80 3.69 6.22 26.88 1.30 24.15 28.9 
NEW YORK  5.73 1.21 4.44 8.49 28.26 2.60 25.88 34.23 
NORTH CAROLINA  6.27 0.53 5.52 7.05 28.49 1.78 26.53 31.81 
NORTH DAKOTA  3.28 0.17 3.08 3.58 27.51 2.61 24.89 33.36 
OHIO  0 0 0 0 24.23 2.31 21.35 28.9 
OKLAHOMA  4.56 2.44 0.4 6.41 26.70 2.09 24.72 30.79 
OREGON  8.12 0.51 6.7 8.86 28.97 2.11 26.45 33.64 
PENNSYLVANIA  0 0 0 0 24.03 2.26 21.25 28.56 
RHODE ISLAND  5.22 0.50 4.31 6.07 26.10 2.46 23.37 31.69 
SOUTH CAROLINA  5.90 0.44 5.3 6.52 27.29 2.14 24.23 31.84 
SOUTH DAKOTA  0 0 0 0 22.86 2.11 20.52 27.59 
TENNESSEE  0 0 0 0 24.50 2.42 20.96 29.25 
TEXAS  0 0 0 0 25.55 2.68 22.26 30.83 
UTAH  6.07 0.41 5.41 7.34 25.70 1.62 23.73 29.13 
VERMONT  5.72 0.70 4.4 6.76 27.48 2.67 24.07 33.25 
VIRGINIA  5.29 0.12 5.15 5.49 27.99 1.89 25.82 32.04 
WASHINGTON  0 0 0 0 22.12 1.88 19.37 25.8 
WEST VIRGINIA  0.87 2.06 0 5.6 23.00 2.77 19.66 28.89 
WISCONSIN  4.84 0.79 3.73 7.15 27.56 2.30 24.98 32.96 
WYOMING  0 0 0 0 21.77 3.20 18.71 28.58 
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TABLE 3 
Baseline Specifications: To Tax Subsidies Increase Homeownership Attainment? 
 
 Dependent variable: household is owner-occupier 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Household 
controls only 
Add location 
controls 
Add  
year-FE 
Add state   
time-trends 
MRS varies by 
income group. 
Mortgage rate subsidy -0.128 -0.0453 -0.223 -0.0882  
(0.123) (0.110) (0.380) (0.377)  
Low income  Mortgage rate 
subsidy 
    -0.272 
    (0.402) 
Moderate income  Mortgage 
rate subsidy 
    -0.211 
    (0.404) 
High income   Mortgage rate 
subsidy 
    -0.00728 
    (0.390) 
Moderate income 
 
0.0781*** 0.0780*** 0.0784*** 0.0785*** 0.0626 
(0.00931) (0.00897) (0.00898) (0.00888) (0.0650) 
High income 
 
0.142*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.0687 
(0.0106) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.00997) (0.0617) 
Total net wealth 0.00542** 0.00446** 0.00453** 0.00486** 0.00494** 
(0.00231) (0.00190) (0.00191) (0.00202) (0.00203) 
Age of head 0.0347*** 0.0313*** 0.0310*** 0.0313*** 0.0313*** 
(0.00186) (0.00175) (0.00176) (0.00176) (0.00176) 
Age of head squared -0.000254*** -0.000227*** -0.000226*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** 
(1.92e-05) (1.78e-05) (1.84e-05) (1.84e-05) (1.84e-05) 
Married 0.196*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 
(0.0126) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
One child 0.0572*** 0.0513*** 0.0518*** 0.0535*** 0.0531*** 
(0.00781) (0.00732) (0.00728) (0.00725) (0.00727) 
Two children 0.0973*** 0.0865*** 0.0867*** 0.0888*** 0.0882*** 
(0.00909) (0.00857) (0.00857) (0.00853) (0.00855) 
Three or more children 0.125*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 
(0.0132) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0119) 
Head unemployed -0.0427*** -0.0401*** -0.0396*** -0.0400*** -0.0395*** 
(0.00766) (0.00727) (0.00722) (0.00713) (0.00712) 
Wife unemployed -0.0359*** -0.0349*** -0.0344*** -0.0339*** -0.0338*** 
(0.00992) (0.00939) (0.00941) (0.00950) (0.00951) 
Share of units that are single-
family 
 0.0894** 0.0891** 0.0977** 0.0978** 
 (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0412) (0.0412) 
Share of units that are in 5+ 
unit-buildings 
 -0.312*** -0.311*** -0.304*** -0.304*** 
 (0.0502) (0.0503) (0.0497) (0.0497) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
State   time-trends No No No Yes Yes 
Constant -0.512*** -0.534 -0.492 1.394 1.460 
(0.0546) (0.366) (0.369) (1.309) (1.290) 
Observations 53279 53279 53279 53279 53279 
Number of households 4197 4197 4197 4197 4197 
R-squared overall model 0.308 0.297 0.297 0.299 0.300 
R-squared within model 0.221 0.287 0.288 0.294 0.294 
R-squared between model 0.374 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 4 
Results for Specifications with Interaction ‘Tax Subsidy   Regulatory Restrictiveness’ 
 
 Dependent variable: household is owner-occupier 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample / 
No State   time-
trends 
Full sample / 
With State   
time-trends 
Specification (2) 
but    
income groups 
Mortgage rate subsidy 0.102 0.0531  
(0.497) (0.480)  
Mortgage rate subsidy  regulatory index -0.329** -0.485***  
(0.137) (0.154)  
Regulatory index -0.00613 0.0384  
(0.0746) (0.0781)  
Low income   
mortgage rate subsidy 
  -0.106 
  (0.515) 
Low income   
mortgage rate subsidy  regulatory index   0.149   (0.268) 
Low income   
regulatory index 
  -0.114 
  (0.0942) 
Moderate income   
mortgage rate subsidy 
  -0.0720 
  (0.518) 
Moderate income   
mortgage rate subsidy  regulatory index   -0.544*   (0.291) 
Moderate income   
regulatory index 
  0.0564 
  (0.100) 
High income   
mortgage rate subsidy 
  0.195 
  (0.491) 
High income   
mortgage rate subsidy  regulatory index   -0.619***   (0.179) 
High income   
regulatory index 
  0.0744 
  (0.0837) 
Moderate income 
 
0.0578*** 0.0563*** 0.0515 
(0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0843) 
High income 
 
0.139*** 0.138*** 0.0631 
(0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0834) 
Total net wealth 0.00352* 0.00385* 0.00393** 
(0.00193) (0.00196) (0.00199) 
Demographics / employment Yes Yes Yes 
Housing stock controls Yes Yes Yes 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year F fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
State   time-trends No Yes Yes 
Constant -1.144*** -0.804* -0.753* 
 (0.202) (0.438) (0.444) 
Observations 29621 29621 29621 
Number of households 2620 2620 2620 
R-squared overall model 0.350 0.349 0.350 
R-squared within model 0.285 0.291 0.291 
R-squared between model 0.360 0.361 0.362 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 5 
Quantitative Effects 
 
Specification 
Implied overall impact of MID on homeownership attainment  
(in percentage points) 
Rent  Own No change Own  Rent Net impact 
Table 3 (1) 0.0 97.3 2.7 -2.7 
Table 3 (2) 0.0 98.9 1.1 -1.1 
Table 3 (3) 0.0 94.9 5.1 -5.1 
Table 3 (4) 0.0 97.9 2.1 -2.1 
Table 3 (5) 0.0 96.0 4.0 -4.0 
Table 4 (1) 5.1 92.1 2.8 +2.3 
Table 4 (2) 6.0 89.2 4.8 +1.2 
Table 4 (3) 5.9 89.9 4.2 +1.7 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1 
Are tax subsidies capitalized to a greater extent in more regulated locations? 
 
 Dependent variable:  
House price appreciation rate 
 (1) (2) 
 More regulated Less regulated 
Percent change in mortgage rate subsidy 0.137*** 0.0683*** 
(0.0175) (0.0114) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes 
State   time-trends Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0579* 0.0674*** 
(0.0311) (0.0255) 
Observations 14181 13881 
Adjusted R-squared  0.486 0.386 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE A2 
Table 4 but with User Cost Controls 
 
 Dependent variable: household is owner-occupier 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample / 
No State   time-
trends 
Full sample / 
With State   
time-trends 
Specification (2) 
but    
income groups 
Mortgage rate subsidy 0.0941 -0.604  
(0.704) (0.640)  
Mortgage rate subsidy  regulatory index -0.319** -0.499***  
(0.140) (0.155)  
Regulatory index -0.0105 0.0383  
(0.0752) (0.0786)  
Low income   
mortgage rate subsidy 
  -0.772 
  (0.662) 
Low income   
mortgage rate subsidy  regulatory index   0.141   (0.268) 
Low income   
regulatory index 
  -0.116 
  (0.0943) 
Moderate income   
mortgage rate subsidy 
  -0.740 
  (0.674) 
Moderate income   
mortgage rate subsidy  regulatory index   -0.556*   (0.290) 
Moderate income   
regulatory index 
  0.0556 
  (0.101) 
High income   
mortgage rate subsidy 
  -0.468 
  (0.648) 
High income   
mortgage rate subsidy  regulatory index   -0.637***   (0.180) 
High income   
regulatory index 
  0.0753 
  (0.0841) 
Moderate income 
 
0.0576*** 0.0563*** 0.0521 
(0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0841) 
High income 
 
0.139*** 0.137*** 0.0622 
(0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0833) 
Total net wealth 0.00358* 0.00384** 0.00392** 
(0.00192) (0.00195) (0.00197) 
TAXSIM property tax rate subsidy 0.00424 0.422 0.426 
(0.274) (0.289) (0.289) 
Effective mortgage interest rate -0.367 0.440 0.505 
(1.274) (1.245) (1.241) 
House price appreciation rate in MSA or state -0.00855 0.0261 0.0246 
(0.0647) (0.0662) (0.0658) 
Average annual rent in MSA or region in 
10,000 dollar 
0.0522 0.108* 0.111* 
(0.0624) (0.0646) (0.0644) 
Other controls and various fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
State   time-trends No Yes Yes 
Constant -1.135*** -0.903* -0.865* 
 (0.248) (0.483) (0.492) 
Observations 29621 29621 29621 
Number of households 2620 2620 2620 
R-squared overall model 0.350 0.349 0.349 
R-squared within model 0.285 0.291 0.292 
R-squared between model 0.360 0.360 0.362 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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